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1231 
Exhaustion Cannot Stifle Innovation: 
A Limitation on the “First Sale” Doctrine 
Joseph L. Roth* 
The Constitution encourages innovation. The Intellectual Property 
Clause empowers Congress to promote science by granting exclusive rights to 
patent owners. Everyone benefits, at least in theory, from such an 
arrangement. The public benefits because inventors have an incentive to 
create new technologies that the public then acquires once the patent term 
expires. Inventors benefit during the patent term by excluding the public 
from (or more likely, selling and leasing the rights to) their inventions. Early 
on, however, the Supreme Court set an important limitation on the right to 
exclude. The Court recognized that purchasers have a property interest in 
the articles they purchase, even if patented. The Court determined that this 
property interest divests the patent owner’s interest in those articles. This 
limitation—known as the “first sale” doctrine—strives to strike a balance 
between the rights of patent and personal property owners. Essentially, 
purchasers obtain full rights to their purchased articles while the patent 
owner retains control over unsold articles. But patent owners have long 
attempted to circumvent the first-sale doctrine. One technique involves selling 
patented articles with express “use restrictions” that purport to limit the 
ways that a purchaser may legally use the article. Scholars have debated 
whether use restrictions are enforceable. Most believe that the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence prohibits such restrictions. Others—including the 
Federal Circuit—have held such restrictions to be permissible. This Note 
explains that the question is not so black and white. Rather, courts must 
look ad hoc at the purpose behind the restriction. If the restriction simply 
helps the patent owner to compete in the market, then the restriction is 
unenforceable. But if the restriction is intertwined with the invention—in 
other words, if the nature of the invention warrants the restriction—then the 
restriction is enforceable. Otherwise, the patent owner would not have the 
 
* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law. Many thanks to Professor Dan Burk for his 
invaluable support throughout the drafting of this Note. Further thanks to Professors Shauhin Talesh, 
Ezra Ross, and Christopher Leslie for their constant mentorship throughout my law school career. 
Finally, I reserve the greatest thanks for my wife, Katherine, whose unyielding support allowed me to 
reach this milestone and many others. 
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incentive to create the invention in the first place. The “first sale” doctrine 
cannot stifle innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a patent owner, Amy, has a patent on a novel type of bicycle. 
Amy makes and sells such bicycles to customers for $300 each. But because each 
bicycle lasts many years, Amy has struggled to maintain a steady customer flow. To 
increase business, Amy decides to only sell bicycles to customers who agree to 
dispose of the bicycle after one year. Customers now must buy a new bicycle each 
year. As an incentive, Amy drops the sale price to $200. 
In this case, Amy has attempted to place a “use restriction”—i.e., an 
enforceable condition1—on the bicycle. In theory, Amy would be happy to raise the 
price and eliminate the restriction. She knows that customers would prefer to 
purchase bicycles without restrictions, and if she had enough customers, she would 
not need the restriction. But she simply does not have enough customers. In other 
words, the market controls whether the restriction exists. 
Now instead, consider Thomas, the owner of a patent on 3-D glasses. Thomas 
plans to sell the 3-D glasses to movie theaters. But, during the testing phase, some 
moviegoers develop vicious eye infections. Thomas determines the 3-D glasses—
which become contaminated after an initial use—are causing these infections. He 
decides to sell the glasses only to theaters that agree to dispose of the glasses after 
a single use.2 
Like Amy, Thomas has also placed a use restriction on the patented article. 
However, unlike Amy’s bicycle sales, the nature of the 3-D glasses—rather than the 
market—controls.3 Thomas’ restriction protects the public health. Unlike Amy, 
 
1. See Thomas Arno, Comment, Use Restrictions and the Retention of Property Interests in Chattels 
Through Intellectual Property Rights, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279, 282 (1994) (“The term ‘use restriction’ 
refers to an enforceable obligation on the part of an owner of an item to use it in a particular way.”). 
Although a use restriction may be placed in a contract, see Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s 
It Good for?, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1087, 1118 (2011), simply providing purchasers with notice is 
sufficient, Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. 
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). In most cases, the patent owner affixes a label—called 
a “notice”—to the sold items, informing purchasers of the restriction. Arno, supra, at 283 n.21. Such 
notice eliminates the possibility that innocent purchasers will be liable for patent infringement. See infra 
notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
2. This example is based on Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956). Polaroid owned 
patents on a type of polarizer and sold 3-D glasses that practiced those patents. Id. at 429, 436. To 
prevent eye infections, Polaroid prohibited reuse of the glasses. Id. The First Circuit held the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the prohibition. Id. at 437. As discussed in Section 
III.A.3.a, infra, this use restriction is enforceable. 
3. Of course, in reality, the patent owner may have monetary incentives as well. The single-use 
restriction on the 3-D glasses would allow the patent owner to sell more glasses. The mere potential for 
market expansion, however, is not dispositive. The Supreme Court has made clear it will look to the 
“substance and realities of the transaction” to determine whether a condition was intended to 
“secur[e] . . . that exclusive right . . . which is granted through the patent law, or whether, under color 
of such a purpose, it is . . . an effort to profitably extend the scope of its patent.” Straus v. Victor 
Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1917). In Marks, the District Court noted the use restriction 
“guaranteed an expansion of Polaroid’s business,” but found that Polaroid had properly raised 
“countervailing public policy considerations.” Marks, 237 F.2d at 436–37. 
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Thomas cannot justify removing the restriction simply by raising the purchase 
price.4 
Finally, consider a patent on genetically modified soybeans. Frank, the patent 
owner, sells to farmers, who use the beans to grow herbicide-resistant crops. The 
crops themselves yield more soybeans, but Frank prohibits farmers from planting 
any second-generation beans. He contends that without the restriction, the patent 
would become worthless after a single sale: no farmer would purchase soybeans if 
she could just grow the beans instead.5 
The market undoubtedly influences this use restriction6 (Frank wants 
customers to continue to buy soybeans). But unlike Amy’s bicycle sales, here, a 
single sale would destroy Frank’s ability to make any future sales. Farmers could just 
grow the beans themselves. In other words, the nature of the invention—rather than 
the market—justifies the restriction. 
Overall, the market controls the restriction in the first example; the nature of 
the invention controls in the latter examples. In each case, if a purchaser disregards 
the use restriction, can the patent owner sue for patent infringement?7 As discussed 
below, the first restriction is unenforceable, but the latter two should be enforced. 
This answer turns on the scope of the patent “first sale” doctrine.8 Under the 
doctrine, the first authorized sale of a patented article “exhausts”—or eliminates—
the patent owner’s right to control the use of that particular article.9 The patent 
owner, through the first sale, has received her full “reward” as to that article, and 
 
4. There are multiple reasons why a patent owner would care about the public health (aside 
from basic morality). The owner needs to protect its brand name and also shield itself against potential 
infringement suits. In Marks, Polaroid acknowledged that it feared liability. Id. at 436. 
5. This example is taken from the facts of Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
6. In the actual Bowman case, the Court determined that petitioner Bowman had improperly 
made, rather than used, the patented invention. Id. at 1766. The first-sale doctrine only enables a 
purchaser to use or sell the purchased articles; the purchaser may not construct a new invention. Id. 
The Court, by ruling that Bowman had not used the invention improperly, thus avoided the question of 
whether the use restriction would have been enforceable. However, it would not be difficult to imagine 
that, in the future, a similar set of facts will arise where the purchaser has used, rather than made, the 
invention. In that scenario, the Court will be faced with the very question it managed to avoid in Bowman. 
7. It appears possible that, regardless, the patent owner could always sue for breach of contract. 
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008) (stating the Court “express[es] 
no opinion on whether contract damages might be available” for use restriction violations). This 
question is beyond the scope of this Note. It is clear, however, that a contract suit is generally not an 
adequate substitute for a patent infringement suit. An infringement suit allows for treble damages and 
attorney’s fees, and is more likely to warrant injunctive relief. Erin Julia Daida Austin, Note, Reconciling 
the Patent Exhaustion and Conditional Sale Doctrines in Light of Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2947, 2950–51 (2009). Further, a breach of contract suit requires privity of contract, 
and is subject to heightened antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 2949, 2951. 
8. The “first sale” doctrine is also called the “exhaustion” doctrine. Static Control Components, 
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Ky. 2009). Scholars have noted, however, 
that the term “exhaustion” is technically incorrect, as it implies that the patent right is used up, while in 
reality, the patent owner only loses the ability to control the specific articles sold. Chiappetta, supra note 
1, at 1087 n.2. I prefer to use the term “first sale,” although I occasionally use the term “exhaustion” 
where more grammatically appropriate. 
9. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625. 
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should not be allowed to “double dip” by receiving further post-sale 
compensation.10 
But may a patent owner sell the patented article with express use restrictions? 
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt v. Medipart found such restrictions enforceable.11 
The court held that—because such restrictions are freely bargained for—the 
restrictions are permissible so long as they appropriately represent the patent 
owner’s reward.12 For example, Amy the bicycle owner could sell bicycles for $300, 
but due to the restriction, had to drop the price to $200, presumably to prevent 
consumers from buying restrictionless bicycles elsewhere. In such a case, 
Mallinckrodt would say that Amy is not “double dipping,” but rather is simply 
receiving a single, bargained-for reward. Under this “conditional sale” theory,13 the 
restrictions in all three examples above are enforceable. 
The Supreme Court may have felt differently. In Quanta Computer v. LG 
Electronics,14 the Supreme Court threw doubt on the continued viability of 
Mallinckrodt and has caused scholars15 and courts16 alike to hold that Quanta has 
overruled Mallinckrodt implicitly.17 The Court stated broadly that an “initial 
 
10. Eric J. Rogers, The Inexhaustible Right to Exclude Reproduction Doctrine, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 
L. REV. 389, 443 (2013) (explaining that the first-sale doctrine serves to prevent “double-dipping”); see 
also Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873). 
11. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
12. Id. at 704–05, 708 (stating that “private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning 
conditions of sale,” so long as the conditions are “reasonably within the reward which the patentee . . . 
is entitled to secure” (citation omitted)). Mallinckrodt interprets a restriction to be within the patent 
owner’s reward so long as the “subject matter [is] within the scope of the patent claims.” Id. at 708. As 
discussed in Section III.C, infra, it is this interpretation—rather than the overall holding—of Mallinckrodt 
that is misguided. 
13. Austin, supra note 7, at 2948. Some scholars refer to this theory as the “Mallinckrodt 
doctrine.” Rogers, supra note 10, at 409. 
14. Quanta, 553 U.S. 617. 
15. E.g., Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating Technologies and the Challenge for the Patent and Antitrust Laws, 32 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 131, 200 (2013) (“The correct view seems to be that a post-sale condition 
cannot continue to haunt subsequent purchases . . . .”); Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-
Based Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 597 (2013) (“Based 
on a review of . . . Quanta, we conclude[ ] that Mallinckrodt has been overruled.”). 
16. E.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-564, 2014 WL 
1276133, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2014) (“Mallinckrodt was overruled by Quanta sub silentio.”), reh’g 
granted Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 785 F.3d 565 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Static Control 
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“After reviewing 
Quanta, Mallinckrodt, and the parties’ arguments, this Court is persuaded that Quanta overruled 
Mallinckrodt sub silentio.”). 
17. The Quanta opinion made no mention of Mallinckrodt. See generally Quanta, 553 U.S. 617. This 
silence makes it unclear just what the Justices thought about Mallinckrodt. Some scholars say it doesn’t 
matter. They argue that Quanta is wholly irreconcilable with Mallinckrodt. See supra note 15. They also 
note, correctly, that in a separate part of the opinion, Quanta implicitly overruled part of Bandag v. Al 
Bolser’s Tire Stores, another Federal Circuit case. Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta, Post-Sale Patentee Controls, 
7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 682, 687 (2008). The argument is that, clearly, the Quanta Justices 
were more than happy to quietly overrule cases that day. This Note contends, however, that the Court’s 
silence evidenced its intention to leave part of Mallinckrodt untouched. See infra Section III.C.2. On April 
14, 2015, the Federal Circuit announced it would go en banc to determine whether to overrule 
Mallinckrodt in light of Quanta. Lexmark, 785 F.3d 565. As this Note goes to press, the en banc decision 
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authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item”18 and 
declined to enforce a freely bargained-for use restriction.19 The Quanta decision gave 
support to the “single royalty” theory: the idea that the initial purchase price is the 
entire reward.20 Under the single-royalty theory, all three restrictions above are 
unenforceable. 
But the single-royalty theory has problems. First, why didn’t Quanta expressly 
overrule Mallinckrodt?21 In fact, as discussed below, the Supreme Court, throughout 
much of its jurisprudence, appears to decide patent exhaustion cases narrowly on 
the facts.22 Why does the Court not provide a bright-line rule, stating that patent 
owners cannot use conditions to circumvent exhaustion? 
Second, if the “single-royalty” theory were the bright-line rule, patent owners 
could simply circumvent that rule. As discussed below, longstanding precedent 
provides that a patent owner may license a patented article with restrictions.23 In other 
words, if a licensee sells the article in violation of those restrictions, the patent owner 
may sue the purchaser for patent infringement.24 The problem is that a patent owner 
 
is still forthcoming. As this Note explains, Mallinckrodt’s reasoning conflicts with Supreme Court 
jurisprudence stretching back to the early twentieth century. See infra Section III.C.1. Thus, if the 
Supreme Court were considering the issue, most of Mallinckrodt should be overruled. However, the 
Court’s opinion in Quanta, as explained below, is consistent with Mallinckrodt. See infra Section III.C.2. 
Here, the issue before the Federal Circuit is whether it should overrule Mallinckrodt “in light of Quanta.” 
Lexmark, 785 F.3d at 566. In other words, if the Federal Circuit is to overrule Mallinckrodt, then Quanta 
should have added something to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that warrants that result. This is 
something Quanta does not do. For this reason, the Federal Circuit should not overrule Mallinckrodt. 
For this Note’s purposes, regardless of whether the Federal Circuit overrules Mallinckrodt, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence will remain the same—use restrictions are unenforceable unless necessary to 
foster innovation. See infra Section III.     
18. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625. 
19. Id. at 638; see also F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking 
Contracting Options off the Table?, 2007–08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 316 (2008) (“[Quanta involved] a 
sophisticated seller and a sophisticated buyer, with subsequent downstream sales from the initial buyer 
to additional sophisticated buyers (where all relevant parties well understood the express terms of the 
relevant contract).”). 
20. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1123. 
21. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature and 
Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 236 (2009) (“Notably, the Supreme Court did not overrule Mallinckrodt 
even though it was strongly urged to do so by the U.S. Solicitor General and others.”). Professor 
Gomulkiewicz finds that “[i]nstead, by [this] approach, the Quanta Computer decision quietly affirmed 
Mallinckrodt and its progeny.” Id. at 237. 
22. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1101, 1104 (explaining that the Court’s analysis has 
frequently “go[ne] beyond that required if exhaustion prevented all patent enforcement of post-sale 
restrictions”); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 21, at 237 (explaining that Quanta could be read as turning 
narrowly on the facts). 
23. See infra Section III.B. As explained below, this Note contends that the law regarding licensee 
restrictions and purchaser restrictions are actually two sides of the same coin. See infra Section III.B.1. 
The same rule applies to both: such restrictions are permissible only to the extent necessary to 
encourage innovation. See infra Section III.B.1. Patent owners will not be able to circumvent the first-
sale doctrine simply by using licensee restrictions. 
24. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181, 183 (1938). As noted below, 
the purchaser must have notice of the licensee’s restriction. Id. at 180–81; see also infra notes 143–44 and 
accompanying text. 
Roth__production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2016  7:17 PM 
2015] A LIMITATION ON THE “FIRST SALE” DOCTRINE 1237 
seeking to restrict a purchaser could use a licensee as a “middleman.” For example, 
say Amy the bicycle owner hires Bob the bicycle maker to make and sell Amy’s 
bicycles. Amy tells Bob, “By the way, you don’t have the authority to sell bicycles 
to people who want to use the bicycles for over a year.”25 Bob is a licensee; 
therefore, under the bright-line rule, a purchaser who uses such a bicycle for over a 
year would be a patent infringer.26 It seems unlikely that the Court would create a 
rule that hinges on whether or not the transaction involves a licensee. 
Third, and most importantly, what would happen if application of the single-
royalty theory would hinder innovation? The Constitution empowers Congress to 
“promote the . . . useful Arts,”27 and the Court has made clear that the patent 
owner’s “reward” is the sole means of promoting such innovation.28 What if a scenario 
arises where the “reward” cannot be obtained through a single royalty? The Court 
would then be at a quandary: How could the Court promote innovation but also 
adhere to the single-royalty theory?29 
This Note first argues that the single-royalty theory—and not the conditional-
sale theory—controls most cases. A patent owner has control of the purchase price; 
she should increase that price to a level adequate to receive her reward. She cannot 
rely on use restrictions. If her invention is important, her reward will be great; if not, 
her reward will be smaller. Under this analysis, the initial bicycle restriction discussed 
above is unenforceable. 
This Note contends, however, that if, due to the nature of the invention, the 
patent owner cannot eliminate the need for the use restrictions through raising the 
purchase price—then, and only then, does the conditional-sale theory apply. As the 3-
D glasses and soybean examples demonstrate, in some cases use restrictions may be 
necessary to protect the public health or a patent’s vitality. These goals cannot be 
met simply by increasing the purchase price. If such conditions were unenforceable, 
then inventors would be unlikely to invest in their inventions, and innovation would 
be stifled. The 3-D glasses and soybean restrictions, therefore, are enforceable. 
 
25. This example in similar to the facts of Mitchell v. Hawley. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 544 (1872). In Mitchell, the patent owner prohibited his licensee from selling patented article for 
use after a certain date. Id. at 545. The licensee sold an article in violation of the restriction, and the 
Court found that the purchaser’s use after the applicable date constituted patent infringement. Id. at 
546. Other commentators have also recognized a patent owner’s potential ability to circumvent the 
first-sale doctrine in this manner. See Austin, supra note 7, at 2972–73. 
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. I generally refer to this process of promoting the useful arts as 
“fostering innovation.” 
28. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942). 
29. To understand this dilemma, we must define the patent owner’s “reward.” Many patent 
scholars agree that the reward is the minimum incentive required to promote innovation. See Harry First, 
Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365, 376 (2007). 
The Court has said that the size of the incentive will depend on the importance of the invention. Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917). This incentive, however, will 
clearly vary depending on the specific facts at issue. The Court, therefore, must carefully review the 
facts and must ensure that innovation is always fostered. For a more detailed discussion, see Section 
III.A.1, infra. 
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This contention justifies the Court’s hesitancy to establish a bright-line rule. 
In fact, a bright-line rule would be contrary to the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court 
has stated that with regard to first-sale cases, it will rule ad hoc—no further than it 
must.30 The Court has also required that the patent owner receive “all the 
consideration” for the article’s use,31 and has declared that the Patent Act must “be 
fairly or even liberally construed.”32 Moreover, the Court has expressly stated: “The 
test has been whether . . . it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his 
reward for the use of the article”33—an ad hoc consideration. 
This contention also explains why the Court treats restrictions on purchasers 
and licensees differently. For purchasers, only rarely—as seen in the 3-D glasses and 
soybean examples—is a use restriction necessary to secure an adequate reward. But 
for licensees, for a variety of reasons, a broader range of restrictions is necessary.34 
Nevertheless, a patent owner must still justify a restriction on a licensee; i.e., a court 
will inquire as to whether the patent owner truly needs the restriction.35 In other 
words, Amy the bicycle owner cannot restrict Bob the bicycle maker’s sales unless 
she has a valid reason for doing so. She cannot use the licensee/purchaser 
distinction to circumvent the first-sale doctrine. 
Section I discusses the origins and purposes of the first-sale doctrine. Section 
I also depicts the rise of, and the rationale behind, the conditional-sale theory in the 
early twentieth century. Section II discusses the subsequent demise of the 
conditional-sale theory and the rise of the single-royalty theory. This Section makes 
clear that—even prior to Quanta—Mallinckrodt’s reasoning conflicted with Supreme 
Court precedent. Section III demonstrates that the Court has not completely closed 
the door on the conditional-sale theory. Rather, the patent owner must always 
receive a reward necessary to foster innovation. Thus, if a patent owner 
demonstrates that the initial purchase price cannot serve as an adequate reward, 
then a court must uphold a necessary use restriction. 
 
30. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 455 (1873) (stating the Court must “decide in each 
case no more than what is directly in issue”); see also Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 
(2013) (“Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before us . . . .”). 
31. See, e.g., Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456 (emphasis added); General Talking Pictures Corp. 
v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 175, 177 (1938) (“full consideration”). 
32. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913). Strict application of the royalty theory 
would not be a liberal construction of the Patent Act. The ad hoc analysis proposed here ensures that 
patent owners receive a full reward, but also stay within the limits intended by Congress. 
33. Masonite, 316 U.S. at 278. 
34. See infra Section III.B. This same logic also explains why the first-sale doctrine does not 
permit a purchaser to “make” a new copy of a patented article. If a purchaser could make more copies 
of the invention, then the patent owner would have great trouble excluding others from that invention. 
Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766. In other words, the patent owner would not have received an adequate 
reward sufficient to foster innovation. See id. (“[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled . . . when the 
patentee has received his reward . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
35. See infra Section III.B. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE 
A. Early Beginnings 
The Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o promote 
the . . . useful Arts,” by providing inventors with “the exclusive Right” to their 
discoveries for a limited time period.36 In 1790, Congress passed the first patent 
statute, which became one of the nation’s very first laws.37 Aside from some early 
procedural changes, the basic structure of the American patent system has been 
constant throughout history.38 
From the very beginning, the right to exclude others39 has been a core feature 
of patent law.40 This exclusive right encourages inventors to invest in the research 
and development of their inventions.41 Presently, the statute empowers the patent 
owner to prevent others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing a 
patented invention.42 The patent owner may sue infringers43 and may receive 
damages or an injunction to remedy the infringing conduct.44 
The “first sale” doctrine provides a complete defense to patent 
infringement.45 Under the first-sale doctrine, the first authorized sale of a patented 
article terminates the patent owner’s exclusive right to “use” or to “sell” the article 
sold.46 As a result, the purchaser may use, sell, or dispose of the article as he pleases, 
without fear of infringement.47 To this day, the doctrine is entirely judge-made—
there is not, and never has been, a first-sale patent statute.48 
 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
37. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 21 (2009). 
38. Id.; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002) (“While the nature of the patent system went through some rather 
dramatic changes in the first fifty years of the Republic . . . by 1836 the essential features of modern 
patent law were in place. Despite periodic revisions . . . the basic structure of the patent system has 
remained unchanged for 165 years.” (footnote omitted)). 
39. The Supreme Court has referred to patent owners’ rights as “the exclusive right to make 
and use their patented inventions.” Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 546 (1872). But the term 
“exclusive right” is a bit misleading. The reality is that a patent “confers no affirmative right,” but 
rather, “confer[s] only the right to exclude others.” BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 16; see also 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“the right to exclude others”). 
40. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37. 
41. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, 
at 37 (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to promote 
innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.”). 
42. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
43. Id. § 281. 
44. Id. §§ 283–284. 
45. ExcelStor Tech., Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG, 541 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
46. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013). Importantly, however, the doctrine 
does not exhaust the patent owner’s right to prevent others from “making” the item. Id. 
47. See id. 
48. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1088 n.3. Interestingly, Congress has codified the first-sale 
doctrine in the copyright context. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). A discussion of why Congress has codified 
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1. Bloomer v. McQuewan 
Courts and scholars49 generally trace the first-sale doctrine to the mid-
nineteenth-century case of Bloomer v. McQuewan.50 The Court’s rationale in Bloomer 
lies at the core of the modern first-sale doctrine.51 Quite simply, because a purchaser 
has a right to use his purchased articles, the Court will limit the patent owner’s ability 
to control the purchaser’s post-sale use.52 
In Bloomer, petitioner Bloomer, a successor in interest to the famous 
Woodworth planing machine patent,53 sued to enjoin McQuewan, a licensee, as well 
as other licensees, from using the planing machines during the seven-year patent 
extension provided by Congress in 1845.54 McQuewan had purchased the right to 
make and use a limited number of planing machines,55 but Bloomer argued that 
such rights did not extend to the 1845 patent extension.56 
The Court ruled for McQuewan.57 The Court held that “when the machine 
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent] 
monopoly.”58 The machine “becomes [the purchaser’s] private, individual 
 
the doctrine for copyright law, but not patent law, is beyond the scope of this Note. It will suffice to 
say that the Copyright Act has a unique legislative history and that copyright “must address the 
significant free speech issues” not present in the patent context. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1087 
n.1 (citation omitted). 
49. See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (citing Bloomer); Server 
& Casey, supra note 15, at 564 (“Bloomer v. McQuewan is generally acknowledged as the Court’s first 
application of the patent exhaustion doctrine . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
50. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). Professor Mark Janis has rightfully 
noted, however, that “glimmers of the exhaustion doctrine can be detected” in the earlier case of Wilson 
v. Rousseau. Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in 
Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 432 (1999). Rousseau involved whether licensees could use 
the patent during the patent extension of 1836. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 669 (1846). 
The Court held they could, id. at 684, as the statutory language provided the extension “shall extend to 
assignees and grantees . . . to use the thing patented,” id. at 677 (emphasis omitted). But the Court’s 
reasoning lies at the core of the first-sale doctrine: “[I]f the construction [were otherwise] . . . the 
common use [would be] arrested . . . . [a result] never contemplated by Congress.” Id. at 684; see also 
Janis, supra, at 433. 
51. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625 (finding modern support for the doctrine in Bloomer). 
52. Id. (citing Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 549). 
53. Professor Janis explains that the Woodworth patent “dominated the marketplace,” leading 
to over one thousand licenses and over a dozen Supreme Court cases. Janis, supra note 50, at 429. 
54. Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 539–40, 547. In 1836, Congress granted a seven-year patent 
extension to any patent owner who could properly demonstrate that he had not received sufficient 
compensation for the development costs of his patent. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 306, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 
124–25. This patent extension expressly applied to grantees, hence the holding of Wilson v. Rousseau. See 
supra note 50. In 1845, Congress extended the patent term for an additional seven years. Bloomer, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) at 547. Because this second extension did not expressly include grantees, id. at 542, the 
Court in Bloomer could not rely on the statutory language, and instead established the first-sale doctrine, 
id. at 551–52. 
55. Id. at 548. 
56. Id. at 542, 548. 
57. Id. at 551–52. 
58. Id. at 549. 
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property,” and therefore, McQuewan and the other licensees “must be entitled to 
continue the use” of the machines.59 
Bloomer is important in demonstrating that the Court does not hold intellectual 
property rights in a higher regard than traditional property rights. Rather, the Court 
will treat intellectual property similar to any other form of personal property.60 And 
the Court has traditionally been reluctant to allow servitudes in personal property.61 
Servitudes hinder the free use and alienability of personal property,62 which in turn 
restrain commerce and free competition.63 Bloomer thus represents a policy decision 
by the Court not to allow intellectual property to diminish the rights of personal 
property owners. 
2. Adams v. Burke 
Adams v. Burke—arguably the most fundamental case in understanding the 
Court’s jurisprudence—greatly elaborates on the first-sale doctrine.64 Adams stands 
for the proposition that, for exhaustion to occur, a patent owner must have received 
full compensation.65 Such compensation, in general, is received through an initial, 
authorized sale.66 However, Adams is clear that application of the first-sale doctrine 
requires ad hoc consideration, due to the important pecuniary and policy interests at 
stake.67 
In 1863, Merrill & Horner received a patent on an improvement in coffin 
lids.68 Merrill & Horner assigned Lockhart & Seelye the exclusive rights to the patent 
 
59. Id. at 550–51. Interestingly, the majority could have discussed the conditional-sale theory, 
discussed in Section I.B., infra, but did not. The majority considered whether a purchaser for value has 
full rights to a purchased article. Id. at 549. But McQuewan’s purchase actually included a use restriction. 
The contract expressly permitted usage only until 1842—the duration of the patent prior to the 1845 
patent extension. Id. at 555 (McLean, J., dissenting). However, the Court did not discuss the use 
restriction. Because the patent, absent the 1845 extension, would have expired in 1842, the purchaser 
would have expected to retain use of the articles even after the contract’s 1842 expiration. Id. at 556 
(“[I]t is answered, that the assignee expected to run his machine after the termination of the contract 
on which the exclusive right would end and become vested in the public.”). In other words, the Court 
did not view the contractual restriction in this case as something that the parties had bargained for. 
60. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888) (stating “[t]his is property,” 
in reference to the patent right); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“Congress, the courts, and commentators increasingly treat intellectual 
property . . . as a good in and of itself.”). 
61. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18 & n.68 (2000). 
62. Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 483, 484, 492 (2010). 
63. Gerald R. Gibbons, Field Restrictions in Patent Transactions: Economic Discrimination and Restraint 
of Competition, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 423, 431 (1966). 
64. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873). 
65. Id. at 456. 
66. Id. (noting that, “in the essential nature of things,” the sale of a machine is considered full 
consideration). 
67. Id. at 455. 
68. Id. at 453–54. 
Roth__production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2016  7:17 PM 
1242 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:1231 
within ten miles of the city of Boston.69 Merrill & Horner then assigned the 
remainder—i.e., exclusive rights outside ten miles of Boston—to Adams.70 Adams 
sued Burke, an undertaker, who had purchased the invention from Lockhart & 
Seelye, but had then used it in Adams’ territory seventeen miles from Boston.71 
The Court began its opinion by expressly noting that it was ruling ad hoc. The 
Court explained that “[t]he vast pecuniary results involved in such cases, as well as 
the public interest, admonish us to proceed with care, and to decide in each case no 
more than what is directly in issue.”72 
The Court then ruled that the patent rights were exhausted under the first-sale 
doctrine.73 The Court declared that “in the essential nature of things,” when the 
patent owner—or a person having her rights—sells the invention, she receives “all 
the royalty or consideration” for the sold item.74 And having received her full 
consideration, the patent owner “parts with the right to restrict [the item’s] use.”75 
The Court acknowledged that the assignee—Lockhart & Seelye—was not 
authorized to sell the coffins outside ten miles of Boston.76 But the Court held that 
neither the patent statute nor the contract allowed the Court to imply this limitation 
onto Burke77—Burke was under no express restriction.78 
Adams v. Burke establishes four important points that were not expressed in 
Bloomer. First, while Bloomer emphasizes the Court’s reluctance to allow servitudes in 
personal property, Adams explains an alternative reason for the doctrine: a patent 
owner should not be permitted to “double dip,” i.e., collect more than her fair 
reward.79 Adams is clear, however, that the patent owner must receive full consideration 
to have received her reward.80 The Court explained that, “in the essential nature of 
things”—i.e., in the usual scenario where the price demanded is sufficient to 
compensate the patent owner81—the patent owner receives full consideration 
simply in selling the item.82 
Second, Adams explains that restrictions cannot be implied from the 
circumstances. Even if Burke had discovered the Lockhart & Seelye restriction, 
Burke could still use the lids as he pleased; after all, he was under no express 
 
69. Id. at 454. 
70. Id. 
71. See id. 
72. Id. at 455. 
73. Id. at 457. 
74. Id. at 456. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 456–57. 
78. Id. at 455. 
79. Id. at 456; see also Rogers, supra note 10, at 443 (noting that “patent royalty double-dipping” 
is what “the principle of patent exhaustion serves to prevent”). 
80. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456. 
81. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1094. 
82. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456. 
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restriction.83 While servitudes in real property typically require either (i) actual, (ii) 
implied, or (iii) constructive notice,84 Adams makes clear that, in the patent context, 
implied notice is not sufficient.85 Of course, Adams does not tell us whether actual 
notice would have been sufficient—but it does leave open that possibility. Third, 
Adams explains that exhaustion can only occur through an authorized sale, i.e., a 
sale made by the patent owner or someone having her rights.86 This rule prevents 
the sale of stolen or counterfeit items from triggering the doctrine.87 
Last, and most importantly, Adams establishes that the first-sale doctrine 
requires ad hoc consideration.88 The pecuniary interests at stake and the public 
interest deserve such a case-by-case consideration.89 By using the language “in the 
essential nature of things,”90 the Court directly leaves open the possibility that 
special cases might arise that warrant a different result than the one in Adams. 
Overall, Adams v. Burke establishes the core tenets of the first-sale doctrine: 
that the first authorized sale generally exhausts a patent owner’s rights to the items 
sold. Adams is considered the foundational case upon which future cases rely.91 
B. The Rise of the Conditional-Sale Theory—and the Logic Behind It 
The conditional-sale theory—i.e., the notion that post-sale use restrictions are 
enforceable—first developed in the late nineteenth century with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mitchell v. Hawley.92 Soon after, in the early twentieth century, the 
Court in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. expressly enforced such restrictions—the high point 
in the doctrine’s jurisprudence.93 The Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the 
doctrine and cogently explained its rationale.94 
Ultimately, in 1917, the Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents overruled A.B. 
Dick.95 However, it is important to recognize that Motion overruled A.B. Dick for 
 
83. Id. at 455. 
84. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1126. 
85. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 457. Further, constructive notice will not suffice, as records are 
not generally created for sales of patented items. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1127. 
86. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456. Adams, however, was not the first case to set forth this 
rule. E.g., Chaffee v. Bos. Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217, 224 (1859) (first-sale doctrine did not 
apply without authorized sale). 
87. See Chaffee, 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 224 (“[Purchasers must] ha[ve] a title to [the patented 
article], and [be] rightfully in the use of it under that title . . . .”). 
88. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 455. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 456. 
91. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 493–94 (1926) (describing the Court’s 
more recent cases involving post-sale use restrictions as an “application of the principle of Adams v. 
Burke”). 
92. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872). 
93. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. 
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
94. Id. at 23–49. 
95. Motion, 243 U.S. at 518. 
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specific statutory reasons,96 and thus did not eliminate the conditional-sale theory 
in its entirety. In fact, Motion respected A.B. Dick’s reasoning, but found such 
reasoning inconsistent with Congress’s intentions.97 A.B. Dick, therefore, is crucial 
in understanding the Court’s modern jurisprudence. 
From a policy perspective, the conditional-sale theory champions the ability 
of parties to contract.98 Voluntary transactions are said to be economically efficient 
so long as the parties have notice of all conditions.99 In these transactions, the 
parties will negotiate a price that reflects the value of the conferred use rights.100 As 
a result, the purchaser is more likely to be willing to purchase the item.101 For 
example, a purchaser may prefer to purchase an item with restrictions because, 
without restrictions, the price may be substantially higher.102 If the first-sale 
doctrine prevents patent owners from implementing use restrictions, then fewer 
purchasers may be able to purchase patented items. 
1. Origins of the Conditional-Sale Theory—Mitchell v. Hawley 
In Mitchell v. Hawley, the Court first described the conditional-sale theory.103 
Mitchell did not actually involve a conditional sale, as the restriction was not on a 
purchaser, but a licensee.104 But Mitchell is important in that it expressly sets up the 
conditional-sale theory in dictum; this language has never been expressly challenged 
or criticized by the Court.105 
Mitchell involved a patent owner, Taylor, who received a patent in 1853 on an 
improvement in machinery for felting hats.106 In 1860, Taylor granted a license to 
Bayley, granting Bayley the exclusive right to make and use the invention in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire as well as to license others to use the 
invention.107 Taylor’s patent originally was to expire in 1867.108 Taylor expressly 
 
96. Id. at 515–16; see also infra Section II.A.2. 
97. Motion, 243 U.S. at 516 (calling A.B. Dick’s reasoning a “plausible argument”). 
98. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1119. 
99. See Arno, supra note 1, at 282. 
100. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
101. Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. 
ST. L. REV. 105, 157 (2012). 
102. See id. 
103. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872). 
104. Id. at 549. 
105. However, almost by definition, the dictum in Mitchell must be considered greatly limited 
as a result of the partial overruling of A.B. Dick. This is especially true considering that A.B. Dick 
extensively relied on the pertinent language in Mitchell. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1912), 
overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Notably, 
the recent Quanta decision makes no mention of Mitchell, which supports the idea that Mitchell’s holding 
has been circumscribed. The fate of Mitchell is identical to the fate of A.B. Dick—circumscribed, but 
still applicable. 
106. Mitchell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 548. 
107. Id. at 545. 
108. Id. 
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provided, in the license, that Bayley would not license any rights that would extend 
beyond 1867.109 
In 1864, Bayley licensed to Mitchell the right to use four felting machines.110 
But this license to Mitchell was unrestricted in time, contrary to the terms of the 
license between Taylor and Bayley.111 Taylor’s patent was ultimately extended 
beyond 1867, and respondent Hawley obtained the rights to the patent in 
Massachusetts.112 Hawley sued Mitchell for patent infringement.113 
The Court ruled for Hawley.114 The Court declared, “Nemo dat quod non habet” 
(no one may give what he does not have).115 Specifically, because Bayley had no 
right to license the invention after 1867, Bayley could not convey such a right to 
Mitchell.116 Interestingly, the Court stated that “[n]otice to the purchaser in such a 
case is not required, as the law imposes the risk upon the purchaser.”117 The Court 
noted that “[c]ertain exceptions undoubtedly exist to th[is] rule, but none of them 
have any application to this case” because the purchaser was on notice of the 
restriction.118 
In dictum, the Court made two things clear. First, patent owners may place 
conditions on sales to purchasers. Second, exhaustion only applies to unconditional 
sales. 
Patented implements or machines sold to be used in the ordinary pursuits 
 
109. Id. This restriction appears similar to the restriction in Bloomer. Cf. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 
55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 555 (1852) (McLean, J., dissenting). In both instances, the patent owner arranged 
for a contract to expire on the same date that the patent expired. And both times, Congress extended 
the patent, and the patent owners wanted their rights back. In Bloomer, the dissent contended that a 
patent extension was foreseeable. Id. at 556. To the dissent, the contract’s termination date clearly 
evidenced a use restriction that had been freely negotiated. Id. (“[W]hen he entered into the contract he 
knew, or is presumed to have known, that the patent might be extended . . . by special act, and if he 
desired an interest under the renewed patent, he should have provided for it in his contract.”). Justice 
McLean concluded the patent owner had been cheated. Id. (“[I]t would seem to be unjust that, under a 
contract to run the machine less than ten years, he should be entitled to run it sixteen years.”). But the 
Bloomer majority assumed that the parties had not foreseen the patent extension. See id. at 556 (discussing 
the majority’s position that “the assignee expected to run his machine after the termination of the 
contract on which the exclusive right would end and become vested in the public”). In other words, 
the majority assumed that the patent owner had been paid in full. And as such, we do not know what 
the result would have been had the use restriction been considered seriously. In Mitchell, the Court could 
have ignored the question, just like it did in Bloomer. But instead, the Court expressly stated in dictum 
that a patent owner’s conditions have legal significance. Mitchell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 548. 
110. Id. at 546. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 551. 
115. Id. at 550. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. The Court did not state, or even hint at, what these exceptions might be. The 
subsequent case of Henry v. A.B. Dick, however, makes clear that, where the sale is authorized, a 
purchaser must receive notice of all conditions. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled 
in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
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of life become the private individual property of the purchasers . . . . Sales 
of the kind may be made by the patentee with or without conditions, as in 
other cases, but where the sale is absolute, and without any conditions, [the 
patent owner’s right is exhausted].119 
This language leaves little doubt that patent owners are permitted to place 
conditions on sold articles. However, the Court did not explain the reasoning 
behind the conditional-sale theory, and it did not discuss the limits of the theory. It 
was not until nearly forty years later that the Court squarely answered these 
questions. 
2. The Zenith—Henry v. A.B. Dick 
In Henry v. A.B. Dick, the Supreme Court, for the first time, explained and 
interpreted the conditional-sale theory. The Court gave the theory broad—nearly 
limitless—scope, holding that any use restriction could be enforced so long as the 
purchaser had received notice.120 
As discussed in Section II, A.B. Dick was ultimately overruled and the scope 
of its doctrine considerably narrowed. However, as explained in Section III, the core 
of the A.B. Dick decision remains good law—namely, that use restrictions, in some 
circumstances, are enforceable and that purchasers must have notice of those 
restrictions to be held liable. 
In A.B. Dick, complainant A.B. Dick owned a patent on a “stencil-duplicating 
machine known as the ‘Rotary Mimeograph.’”121 A.B. Dick sold one such 
mimeograph to Christina Skou, and affixed a notice stating that the mimeograph 
could only be used with paper, ink, and other supplies made by A.B. Dick.122 Sidney 
Henry of the Henry Company (an ink manufacturer) sold ink to Ms. Skou even 
though Henry had knowledge of A.B. Dick’s license agreement.123 A.B. Dick sued 
Henry for patent infringement.124 
The Court ruled in favor of A.B. Dick, stating that any “reasonable stipulation, 
not inherently violative of some substantive law, imposed by a patentee as part of a 
sale of a patented machine, would be . . . valid and enforceable.”125 The Court, in a 
 
119. Mitchell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 548. 
120. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 39, 49. 
121. Id. at 11. 
122. Id. at 39, 49. This type of use restriction is called a “tying” restriction: the use of an 
unpatented item is “tied” to the use of a patented item. After Motion Picture Patents overruled A.B. Dick, 
tying restrictions became unlawful per se, under a separate patent doctrine called the “misuse” doctrine. 
The rationale was that a patent owner, by implementing a tying restriction, “misused” the patent because 
the owner gained control over unpatented items. Recently, in 1988, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 
271(d), mandating that tying restrictions are not per se unlawful, but rather are lawful restrictions unless 
the patent owner has market power and the restrictions have anticompetitive effects. Act of Nov. 19, 
1988, tit. II, Pub. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674. The Court’s holding in A.B. Dick affected both 
the misuse doctrine and the first-sale doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 149-53. 
123. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 11 (majority opinion); id. at 51 (White, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 14 (majority opinion). 
125. Id. at 31. 
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lengthy opinion, provided three distinct reasons for this result.126 First, the Court 
noted that the use of a patented machine is often more valuable to the patent owner 
than the mere value of the machine, and therefore the patent owner has a right to 
restrict such use.127 For support, the Court cited to circuit courts and English cases 
that had expressly recognized the patent owner’s ability to create use restrictions.128 
The Court heavily cited the dictum in Mitchell v. Hawley as well.129 
Second, the Court justified use restrictions by noting that a patent owner has 
the ability to restrict the use of the patent entirely by choosing to sell to no one.130 
As Professor Hovenkamp explains, a use restriction is a type of output reduction.131 
Because a patent owner has the ability to limit output all the way down to zero, it 
makes sense to allow the patent owner to reduce output to some point more than 
zero, but less than one hundred.132 A.B. Dick did not have to let anyone use its 
mimeographs, so it certainly could allow customers to use the mimeographs for 
limited purposes.133 
Third, the Court considered why Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus,134 a copyright case, was 
not controlling.135 Bobbs-Merrill involved a “resale” restriction—the copyright owner 
of a novel sought to prohibit purchasers from reselling the novel for less than one 
dollar.136 Bobbs-Merrill found the restriction unenforceable, holding that Congress 
did not intend to allow copyright owners to control future sales.137 Bobbs-Merrill 
distinguished the earlier case of E. Bement & Sons—a contract case involving a 
restriction against a patent licensee138—on the notion that applying patent law to 
 
126. Id. at 23–49. Before the Court even arrived at the question of use restrictions, it first had 
to respond to Henry’s contention that the matter was outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 13–14. The 
Court found it had jurisdiction, as “some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction [of the 
patent laws], [but] sustained by another [construction] of those laws[.]” Id. at 16. Enforcement of use 
restrictions, therefore, is a federal question—this holding of A.B. Dick has never been challenged by 
the Court. 
127. Id. at 25 (“[T]he mere value of a patented machine is often, as is proved to be in this case, 
insignificant in comparison with the value of its use . . . .” (quoting Porter Needle Co. v. Nat’l Needle 
Co., 17 F. 536 (D. Mass. 1883))). 
128. Id. at 37–43. 
129. Id. at 19–22. In addition, the Court cited to a leading treatise for the proposition that “any 
person having the right to sell may at the time of sale restrict the use of his vendee.” Id. at 24 (quoting 
2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 824 (Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. 1890)). 
130. Id. at 32. The ability of a patent owner to withhold use of her invention entirely had 
previously been determined by the Court. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 
(1908). 
131. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in 
Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 529 (2011). 
132. Id. at 529–30. 
133. See A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 32. 
134. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
135. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 43–45. 
136. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341. 
137. Id. at 350–51. 
138. Id. at 345. 
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copyright law might “greatly embarrass the consideration of a [future patent] 
case.”139 
The Court in A.B. Dick determined that this “[future patent] case” was, in fact, 
the present case. The Court explained that Bobbs-Merrill had rightly distinguished 
Bement, as patent law is very different than copyright law.140 Specifically, the patent 
statute grants the exclusive right to make, sell, and use the patented item; by contrast, 
the copyright statute grants the exclusive right to make and sell the copyrighted 
work, but not to use it.141 The Court concluded, for this reason, that Bobbs-Merrill 
did not control the present case.142 
As a final matter, the Court established the requirement that a purchaser 
“must have notice” of the use restriction for it to be enforceable.143 The Court 
explained that a purchaser “has a right to assume, in the absence of knowledge, that 
the seller passes an unconditional title to the machine, with no limitations upon the 
use.”144 This holding is critical in that it ensures that innocent purchasers will not 
be held liable for patent infringement. Such protection is a major theme of the law 
of servitudes. Property law generally permits servitudes in real property—but not in 
personal property—because purchasers are much better able to identify servitudes 
in real property than in personal property. In other words, purchasers should not 
be caught unawares. Here, by requiring notice, the Court justified allowing 
servitudes in patented personal property. 
Overall, it appears clear that the conditional-sale theory had reached its zenith 
by 1912. Adams v. Burke had implied that use restrictions might be enforceable. 
Mitchell v. Hawley had said so in dictum. And A.B. Dick then expressly, and in depth, 
explained why courts should enforce use restrictions. Not surprisingly, the Court’s 
subsequent overruling of A.B. Dick greatly limited the conditional-sale theory. But, 
as discussed below in Section II, the Court overruled A.B. Dick for one specific 
reason: Congress did not intend for patent owners to implement use restrictions for 
personal gain.145 This reason is critically important. With this reason in mind, 
Section III then explains that certain use restrictions would not violate Congress’s 
intent.146 These use restrictions are enforceable, notwithstanding the demise of the 
A.B. Dick era. 
II. THE ARRIVAL OF THE SINGLE-ROYALTY THEORY 
A. The Demise of the Conditional-Sale Theory 
The conditional-sale theory had reached its height in 1912. The theory was 
 
139. Id. 
140. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 45–47. 
141. Id. at 46. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 26. 
144. Id. 
145. See infra Section II.A.2. 
146. See infra Section III.A. 
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supported by the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence, and the rationale behind it 
was cogent. However, just a mere year later in Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, the Supreme 
Court began to chip away at the theory, holding that restrictions on the right to 
“sell” were unenforceable.147 In 1917, the Court in Motion Picture Patents extended 
this holding to restrictions on “use” and expressly overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick.148 
Some scholars, however, have attempted to save the conditional-sale theory. 
They argue that A.B. Dick was only overruled under the doctrine of “patent 
misuse.”149 Specifically, A.B. Dick had permitted use restrictions called “tying” 
restrictions.150 Motion also involved tying restrictions, and Bauer involved resale 
restrictions.151 These sorts of restrictions, for many years after Motion, would be held 
by the Court to be per se patent misuse.152 
The argument is that because A.B. Dick, Bauer, and Motion all turned on patent 
misuse, A.B. Dick must therefore still be good law to the extent that a patent owner 
does not implement use restrictions to further patent misuse. In other words, use 
restrictions that are properly within the patent’s scope are enforceable. The Federal 
Circuit in particular—beginning with Mallinckrodt—appears to have adopted this 
reasoning.153 
However, this argument fails for two reasons. First, it is clear that Motion 
overruled A.B. Dick, not only on misuse grounds, but also because the Court found 
the conditional-sale theory inconsistent with the will of Congress.154 In fact, Motion 
expressly stated that its ruling would affect “the extent to which a patentee . . . [may] 
prescribe . . . the conditions of [a patented article’s] use.”155 In other words, Motion 
intended to limit the conditional-sale theory. 
Second, the Court’s explanation of the first-sale doctrine in subsequent cases 
cannot be aligned with the conditional-sale theory. The Court in multiple cases, 
most recently in Quanta v. LG Electronics, uses strong language that evidences the 
demise of the conditional-sale theory.156 That language strongly supports the rise of 
 
147. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1913). 
148. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516, 518 (1917). 
149. See, e.g., Yina Dong, Note, A Patent Exhaustion Exposition: Situating Quanta v. LGE in the 
Context of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N2, ¶ 48 (2010); see also Gomulkiewicz, 
supra note 21, at 228 (finding that conditions are enforceable, but are subject to the misuse doctrine); 
Austin, supra note 7, at 2980 (finding that “beyond the antitrust and patent misuse laws” parties have 
the freedom to contract). 
150. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
151. Motion, 243 U.S. at 506; Bauer, 229 U.S. at 8. 
152. Dong, supra note 149, ¶ 38; see also supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
153. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
154. Motion, 243 U.S. at 516. 
155. Id. at 509. 
156. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625–26 (2008) (“Although the 
Court permitted postsale restrictions on the use of a patented article in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 
1 (1912), that decision was short lived.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 
241, 251 (1942) (“[T]he patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the 
article, and . . . once that purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and 
enjoyment of the thing sold.”); Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 25 (1918) 
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the “single royalty” theory—the idea that a patent owner must receive her entire 
reward through the initial sale. 
1. Chipping Away—Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell 
In Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, complainant Bauer & Cie (Bauer) owned a patent 
on the vitamin Sanatogen, which it provided to its agent Hehmeyer through a 
license.157 The license allowed Hehmeyer to set the price at which purchasers could 
resell purchased Sanatogen.158 When defendant O’Donnell purchased and sold 
Sanatogen for less than the provided resale price, Bauer sued O’Donnell.159 
The Court ruled for O’Donnell.160 The Court stated that “care should be taken 
not to extend by judicial construction the rights and privileges which it was the 
purpose of Congress to bestow.”161 Citing Bobbs-Merrill, the Court noted that “[t]he 
sale of a patented article is not essentially different from the sale of a book.”162 Like 
in Bobbs-Merrill, the Court determined that fixing the resale price would go “beyond 
[the statute’s] fair meaning and secure privileges not intended to be covered by the 
act of Congress.”163 
Bauer makes clear that once a purchaser “has paid to the [patentee] the full 
price asked for the article sold,” the patent owner cannot then seek to control future 
sales; doing so would go beyond Congress’s intentions.164 Although the Court 
distinguished A.B. Dick—noting that, unlike the present case, the sale in A.B. Dick 
transferred only a “qualified title,” it set the stage to overrule A.B. Dick four years 
later.165 
2. A.B. Dick’s Downfall—Motion Picture Patents 
Motion Picture Patents involved a patent on a mechanism for showing motion 
pictures.166 The patent owner granted a licensee the right to make and sell the 
 
(“[O]ne who had sold a patented machine and received the price . . . could not, by qualifying restrictions 
as to use, keep under the patent monopoly a subject to which the monopoly no longer applied.”). 
Professor Chiappetta notes that many of the Court’s exhaustion statements are technically dicta, but 
explains that these statements are necessary to understand “the full operation of the doctrine.” 
Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1107 n.105. 
157. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 8 (1913). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 9. 
160. Id. at 18. 
161. Id. at 10. 
162. Id. at 13. 
163. Id. at 12. 
164. Id. at 11. 
165. Id. at 15. Of course, this finding—that sales with restrictions on use convey only a qualified 
title—cannot be used to save the conditional-sale theory. Bauer preceded Motion, and therefore, had to 
distinguish itself from A.B. Dick. Bauer did so by finding a difference between restrictions on “sell” and 
restrictions on “use.” Id. But Motion expressly holds that use restrictions are “precisely the same” as 
resale restrictions. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). 
166. Motion, 243 U.S. at 505. 
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invention.167 Under this license, the licensee had to notify any purchasers that (1) 
the invention could only be used to show the patent owner’s motion pictures (i.e., 
a tying restriction) and (2) the purchaser needed to contact the patent owner to 
discover “other terms to be . . . complied with by the user.”168 The defendants 
violated the terms of the notice, and the patent owner sued for patent 
infringement.169 
The Court ruled for the defendants.170 The Court first made clear that its 
holding would affect both (a) the conditional-sale theory and (b) the misuse 
doctrine: 
It is obvious that in this case we have presented anew the inquiry, which is 
arising with increasing frequency in recent years, as to the extent to which 
a patentee or his assignee is authorized by our patent laws to prescribe by 
notice attached to a patented machine [(a)] the conditions of its use and 
[(b)] the supplies which must be used in the operation of it, under pain of 
infringement of the patent.171 
The Court resolved these issues by analyzing “three rules [of statutory 
interpretation] long established by this court, applicable to the patent law.”172 The 
Court used the first two rules to find the tying restriction impermissible under the 
doctrine of patent misuse.173 The third rule, however, directly implicated the 
conditional-sale theory. 
This third rule involved Congress’s rationale behind the Patent Act. The Court 
explained that the “primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private 
fortunes for the owners of patents,” but is rather “to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts.”174 The Court accepted that patent owners should be “fairly, 
even liberally treated,” but urged that Congress primarily intended to use the patent 
owner’s “reward,” to foster innovation.175 
The Court acknowledged that A.B. Dick’s major justification for the 
conditional-sale theory—that the ability to restrict all use warrants, a fortiori, the 
ability to restrict some use—was a “plausible argument.”176 But the Court said: “The 
 
167. Id. at 506. 
168. Id. Per the license, these “other terms” were solely regarding royalty payment. Id. The Court 
had previously held that violation of royalty terms do not warrant an infringement suit. Henry v. A.B. 
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 16 (1912), overruled in part by Motion, 243 U.S. 502. But the Court refers to these 
terms as “terms not stated in the notice,” Motion, 243 U.S. at 509, without mention of royalties. The 
Court’s wording thus appears to treat this provision as one warranting an infringement suit. 
169. Motion, 243 U.S. at 507. 
170. Id. at 519. 
171. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). Motion, of course, did not expressly use the phrase “misuse 
doctrine” because that doctrine did not exist yet. Rather, Motion is credited for establishing the misuse 
doctrine. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The doctrine of 
patent misuse . . . beg[an] with the 1917 decision in Motion Picture Patents . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
172. Motion, 243 U.S. at 510. 
173. See id. at 510–11. 
174. Id. at 511 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
175. See id. 
176. Id. at 516. In other words, the Court acknowledged that A.B. Dick’s reasoning was sound. 
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defect in this thinking springs from the substituting of inference and argument for 
the language of the statute . . . .”177 The Court, citing Bauer, then said that the 
“statutory authority to grant the exclusive right to ‘use’ a patented machine is not 
greater, indeed it is precisely the same, as the authority to grant the exclusive right to 
‘vend.’”178 In other words, while Bauer held that “sell” restrictions went beyond 
Congress’s intentions, Motion now extended that holding to “use” restrictions. 
The Court then concluded: “It is obvious that . . . Henry v. [A.B.] Dick Co. must 
be regarded as overruled.”179 This holding makes clear that the conditional-sale 
theory—at least in its original form as expressed in A.B. Dick—is at an end. 
Conditional sales, in general, are simply inconsistent with Congress’s intentions: the 
Patent Act was not designed to enhance patent owners’ fortunes.180 
However, as discussed in Section III, the Court did not completely eliminate 
the conditional-sale theory. Motion placed significant weight on the fact that the 
patent owner’s reward must serve to innovate science, noting that the patent owner 
must be “fairly, even liberally, treated.”181 And Motion, at bottom, was concerned 
with the intent of Congress. It appears fairly clear, then, that a use condition required 
for scientific innovation would survive the Court’s scrutiny.182 
B. The Single-Royalty Theory—the Purchase Price Is the Entire Reward. 
The single-royalty theory arose from the ashes of the conditional-sale theory. 
After Motion, patent owners could no longer implement use restrictions to receive 
their reward. As a result, these owners had to receive their entire reward for a 
patented item through its purchase price—i.e., a single royalty. Under this “single 
royalty” theory, payment of the purchase price exhausts the patent owner’s rights 
to the article sold.183 
One criticism of the single-royalty theory is that the theory limits the patent 
owner’s reward by removing the ability of the parties to contract.184 For example, 
this Note’s Introduction depicted a bicycle patent owner who struggled to make 
 
177. Id. at 514. 
178. Id. at 516 (emphasis added). 
179. Id. at 518 (citation omitted). 
180. Last, the Court then moved on to discuss the license’s second provision: that the purchaser 
was bound by “other terms” not stated in the license. Id. The Court discussed the public interest. It 
noted that Motion had already received over $200,000 through the patent. Id. Any further restriction 
would grant “such a potential power for evil over an industry which must be recognized as an important 
element in the amusement life of the nation.” Id. at 519. Such a restriction would be “gravely injurious 
to th[e] public interest, which we have seen is more a favorite of the law than is the promotion of private 
fortunes.” Id. This ad hoc analysis— comparing the patentee’s reward to the public interest—lies at the 
core of the first-sale doctrine. See infra Section III.A.1. 
181. Motion, 243 U.S. at 511. 
182. See infra Section III. 
183. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1123. 
184. Id. at 1104. 
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sales without implementing a use restriction.185 To the patent owner, the use 
restriction was just as important as, if not more important than, the purchase price. 
The Court has made clear, however, that patent owners are not receiving less 
than their fair reward.186 Rather, the purchase price is the value of their reward. In 
other words, the Court defines “reward” as the value received through the purchase 
price—and not the full value that the patent owner could potentially receive via use 
restrictions. In the bicycle example, the Court would say that if the patent owner 
cannot make sufficient sales, then too bad—she deserves a smaller reward. 
The Court most clearly expresses the single-royalty ideology in Motion: 
[The single-royalty theory] is the fair as well as the statutory measure of 
[the patent owner’s] reward for his contribution to the public stock of 
knowledge. If his discovery is an important one his reward under such a 
construction of the law will be large, as experience has abundantly proved, 
and if it be unimportant he should not be permitted by legal devices to 
impose an unjust charge upon the public in return for the use of it.187 
The single-royalty theory thus provides adequate reward for a patent owner’s 
contribution to society. The Court believes that such a result is not only supported 
by the patent statute, but is also the “fair” result.188 But as discussed in the 
Introduction, the single-royalty theory removes a patent owner’s ability to freely 
negotiate and price discriminate.189 From a policy perspective, is the single-royalty 
theory the preferable result? 
As discussed below, there are significant policy justifications for the single-
royalty theory that strongly support the theory’s application in almost all cases. 
These policy arguments can be divided into arguments regarding (1) rights, (2) 
efficiency, and (3) the power of the Court. The first two categories focus on why 
the single-royalty theory is the preferred result. The third category demonstrates 
that, regardless, any change must be implemented by Congress, not the Court. 
1. Rights 
The single-royalty theory protects the rights of the purchaser. While it is true—
as critics argue—that use restrictions are often freely bargained for, this “freely 
bargained for” justification stands on a slippery slope. The justification assumes 
that the purchaser has received a lower purchase price in exchange for accepting the 
use restriction. In other words, the assumption is that if the purchase price = X 
value, then the value of the use restrictions plus the new, lower purchase price also 
= X value. 
But that is not always the case. Say, for example, a patent owner develops a 
novel invention that will sell for X value, but not more. Say also that purchasers 
 
185. See supra Introduction. 
186. Motion, 243 U.S. at 513. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. See supra Introduction. 
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cannot easily obtain the invention from other sources. In such a case, the patent 
owner would be incentivized to tack on a few use restrictions for good measure, in 
an attempt to enlarge her reward. Essentially, the use restrictions plus the purchase 
price = more than X value. 
The reality is that, while some purchasers would be able to bargain down the 
purchase price, others likely would not. This reality is particularly true considering 
that any use restriction would “run with the article”—remaining in effect as the item 
moved from person to person over time.190 The first-sale doctrine thus protects 
purchasers who do not have the ability to bargain. 
Further, the patent owner, in theory, still receives an adequate reward. If we 
assume that the patent owner lowered the purchase price to justify the use 
restriction, then logically, she should be able to raise the price and remove the 
restriction. Further, as noted above, the patent owner may still utilize use 
restrictions; she will just need to receive her damages under a breach of contract 
suit.191 The single-royalty theory thus protects purchasers while still meeting the 
needs of patent owners. 
2. Efficiency 
The single-royalty theory also encourages the influx of goods into the open 
market, which encourages innovation and prevents waste. Allowing patent owners 
to create servitudes in personal property would create artificial scarcity, which in 
turn, would raise prices to supracompetitive levels.192 
For example, imagine that a prospective purchaser wishes to buy a patented 
article without any servitudes. The purchaser likely could not obtain such an article 
from another consumer because any existing servitudes would run with the 
article.193 Rather, the purchaser would need to purchase it directly from the patent 
owner. The patent owner would likely be able to charge a high price because the 
purchaser could not easily obtain the article elsewhere. The article has been sold for 
more than it is worth. 
Servitudes in personal property would also serve to hinder innovation.194 
“User innovation”—that is, a purchaser’s ability to himself invent—requires that 
the purchaser be allowed to manipulate and experiment with the articles around 
 
190. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1126. As discussed above, however, all patent owner must 
take measures to ensure that all subsequent purchasers have notice of the restriction. Henry v. A.B. 
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled in part by Motion, 243 U.S. 502. 
191. See Austin, supra note 7. 
192. Douglas Fretty, Note, Both a License and a Sale: How to Reconcile Self-Replicating Technology with 
Patent Exhaustion, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1, 14 (2011). 
193. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1126. 
194. See Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. 
REV. 55, 114–15. 
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him.195 Requiring permission to use patented articles in certain ways would hinder 
such innovation; free use is efficient use.196 
Finally, use restrictions encourage waste. As Professor Chiappetta notes, 
because purchasers will often have trouble reselling the burdened item, they are 
likely to dispose of it instead.197 For example, in the bicycle example in this Note’s 
introduction,198 purchasers were precluded from using sold bicycles after one year. 
After a year, the purchasers would need to dispose of the still-working bicycle—an 
inefficient use of a working article. Eliminating servitudes promotes efficiency. 
3. The Power of the Court 
As demonstrated above, there are compelling policy justifications for the 
single-royalty theory. However, it is undeniable that patent owners who strongly 
value use restrictions are harmed. If we feel that patent owners deserve better, 
should change be implemented through Congress or through the Court? The 
answer is almost certainly through Congress. The Constitution directly empowers 
Congress to grant patent owners with exclusive rights in order to encourage 
innovation. 
Congress, and not the Court, controls the extent of the patent owner’s 
exclusive rights. The Court has absolutely no power to grant more rights than 
bestowed by Congress. This is true even if policy justifications support increasing 
that patent owner’s rights. The Court is limited to enforcing the will of Congress, 
which as we have seen, requires no more than ensuring that innovation is fostered 
to benefit the public interest.199 
In Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., the Court expressly noted that the 
Court could not reach beyond the will of Congress to benefit patent owners.200 The 
facts were very similar to those in Bauer v. O’Donnell.201 The complainant owned a 
patent and attempted to control the price at which purchasers could resell the sold 
patented articles.202 The Boston Store agreed to the provided resale provision but 
failed to abide by it.203 
In the resulting infringement lawsuit, the complainant urged the Supreme 
Court that the single-royalty theory should not apply. The complainant stressed that 
 
195. Id. at 114. 
196. See id. at 115. 
197. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1128. 
198. See supra Introduction. 
199. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917). 
200. See Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 26 (1918). 
201. See supra Section II.A.1. 
202. Bos. Store, 246 U.S. at 18–19. 
203. Id. at 19–20. 
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it valued the resale restriction much more highly then the gross consideration 
price.204 This intent, the complainant argued, should resolve the case in its favor.205 
The Court ruled for defendant Boston Store.206 The Court used particularly 
strong language, making very clear that the single-royalty theory had usurped the 
conditional-sale theory: “[O]ne who ha[s] sold a patented machine and received the 
price . . . c[an] not, by qualifying restrictions as to use, keep [that machine] under 
the patent monopoly . . . .”207 This holding constitutes “the fundamental ground 
upon which, as we have seen, the decided cases must rest.”208 
The Court then directly addressed the complainant’s argument that the use 
restrictions were of substantial value. The Court acknowledged its ruling could 
potentially cause “grave disaster . . . to the holders of patent rights.”209 But the Court 
bluntly concluded: “[T]he remedy . . . is to be found, not in an attempt judicially to 
correct doctrines which by reiterated decisions have become conclusively fixed, but 
in invoking the curative power of legislation.”210 
In other words, the Court in Bauer and Motion had clearly defined Congress’s 
intent, and the Court in Graphophone was unable to deviate from that intent. The 
abovementioned rights and efficiency arguments, therefore, are of little practical 
interest to the Court. Rather, such issues must be addressed by Congress.211 
C. A Modern Application—Quanta v. LGE 
The Supreme Court’s most recent application of the single-royalty theory came 
in the 2008 decision of Quanta v. LG Electronics.212 Before this point in time, the 
 
204. Id. at 10. The Boston Store had also received “dealers’ discounts” in exchange for accepting 
the license’s terms. Id. at 18. 
205. See id. at 10. 
206. Id. at 27. 
207. Id. at 25. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 25–26. 
210. Id. at 26. 
211. Further, it is important to note that Congress’s intentions in this area did not change with 
the implementation of the 1952 Patent Act. As Justice Black noted in his concurrence in Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.: 
[J]ust before the [1952 patent] bill was passed in the Senate, Senator Saltonstall asked on the 
floor, “Does the bill change the law in any way or only codify the present patent laws?” 
Senator McCarran, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee which had been in charge of the 
bill for the Senate, replied, “It codifies the present patent laws.” 
365 U.S. 336, 347 n.2 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 9323 (1952)). At oral 
argument in Quanta, Justice Ginsburg asked the Deputy Solicitor General whether there was “a reason 
why Congress codified th[e] [first-sale doctrine] in the Copyright Act, but not in the Patent Act?” 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) 
(No. 06-937). The government responded—and the Court did not question its response—that 
“[Congress] did not attempt in any way to override or change the effect of the first sale doctrine.” Id. 
at 18. The same is true of the 2011 America Invents Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. 
212. Quanta, 553 U.S. 617. The Supreme Court came close, but did not address the issue, in 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
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Court had not directly addressed the first-sale doctrine in over half a century.213 By 
holding that exhaustion occurs at the time of the first authorized, initial sale214—
notwithstanding any use restrictions—the Court reaffirmed the single-royalty 
theory.215 
Respondent LG Electronics (LGE) owned a portfolio of computer 
technology patents.216 Three of these patents involved methods of operating a 
computer system.217 LGE licensed this portfolio to Intel Corporation (Intel).218 
Under the license, Intel received broad rights to “make, use, [and] sell” the LGE 
patents.219 Intel, in turn, sold microprocessors and chipsets that practiced LGE’s 
patents to defendant Quanta.220 
However, Intel’s license also specified that no license was granted “to any 
third party” to combine licensed products with non-LGE or non-Intel components 
(rather, the purchaser would need to obtain a separate license for those other 
components).221 Further, in a separate “Master Agreement,” Intel agreed to notify 
all third-party purchasers of this prohibition; and indeed, Intel properly notified 
Quanta.222 But Quanta disregarded this notice by combining the licensed products 
with nonlicensed components, and LGE sued Quanta for patent infringement.223 
 
213. The Court had last discussed the exhaustion doctrine directly in 1942. E.g., United States 
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
214. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 621. 
215. Quanta also addressed two other aspects of the first-sale doctrine that, although matters of 
vast importance, go beyond the scope of this Note. First, the Court for the first time held that patented 
methods could be exhausted; previously, the Court had only applied the doctrine to patented products. 
Id. at 629–30. Second, the Court held that the first sale of an essential component of a patented item 
exhausted the patent owner’s rights to the entire item. Id. at 634–35. (citing Univis, 316 U.S. at 250–51). 
Interestingly, the Court’s ruling on method patents was the only novel holding in Quanta. The holdings 
regarding components and use restrictions had already been firmly established in Univis, 316 U.S. 241, 
and Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. 502, respectively. 
216. Id. at 621. 
217. U.S. Patent No. 4,939,641 disclosed a system for ensuring that random access memory 
(RAM) and cache memory are updated together, eliminating the problem of “stale” data. Id. at 622. U.S. 
Patent No. 5,379,379 disclosed a novel method of processing “write” and “read” requests to and from 
RAM that allows for fast, yet still accurate, processing. Id. U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733 disclosed a method 
allowing for more efficient data traffic to occur via the bus connecting the computer’s microprocessor 
to a chipset. Id. at 622–23. 
218. Id. at 623. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 623–24. 
221. Id. at 623. 
222. Id. at 624. 
223. Id. Proponents of the conditional-sale theory have argued that Quanta has no effect on the 
first-sale doctrine simply because the license agreement there was poorly written. Austin, supra note 7, 
at 2970–71. Specifically, the license agreement noted that “nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter 
the effect of patent exhaustion.” Quanta, 553 U.S. at 623. And the Master Agreement stated that “a 
breach of this Agreement shall have no effect on . . . the Patent license.” Id. at 624. Some scholars 
suggest that, because Quanta did not involve an enforceable use restriction, the conditional-sale theory 
is still viable. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 21, at 237; Austin, supra note 7, at 2970. However, this 
argument fails, as simply distinguishing Quanta cannot save the conditional-sale theory. As this Note 
has demonstrated, that doctrine met its demise ninety years earlier in Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. 502. 
See supra Section II.A. 
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The Court ruled for Quanta.224 The Court noted that Henry v. A.B. Dick had 
permitted use restrictions, but stated that “that decision was short lived.”225 Citing 
Motion Picture Patents, the Court reiterated that the Patent Act was designed “to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts,” and “not the creation of private 
fortunes.”226 
Turning to the facts, the Court noted that Intel had properly notified Quanta 
of the use restriction, and had received broad rights to make, use, and sell the 
patent—that is, an authorized sale had occurred.227 The Court concluded that this 
“authorized sale . . . exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent 
holder from invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the article.”228 
In sum, the Supreme Court has made clear that the single-royalty theory is the 
law. In fact, district courts have concluded that the conditional-sale theory has been 
abolished.229 The strong language in Motion, Graphophone, and Quanta supports this 
conclusion.230 But as discussed below, these cases all involve patent owners 
implementing use restrictions to help themselves in the market (i.e., to enhance their 
private fortunes). Section III discusses that, in limited circumstances, use 
restrictions are necessary to promote innovation and the public interest, and 
therefore, fall within the intentions of Congress. This conclusion is consistent with 
the Court’s first-sale jurisprudence. 
III. THE SINGLE-ROYALTY THEORY CANNOT STIFLE INNOVATION 
As detailed above, the Supreme Court’s application of the first-sale doctrine 
strongly supports the application of the single-royalty theory. But the Court did not 
create a bright-line rule with no exceptions. Rather, the single-royalty theory yields 
under the appropriate circumstances because, as first explained by Motion Picture 
Patents, Congress’s intentions are dispositive. 
Section III.A below explains that the single-royalty theory is not a bright-line, 
“no exceptions” rule. Rather, the Court’s jurisprudence mandates an ad hoc analysis, 
ensuring that the patent owner’s reward sufficiently fosters innovation. This Section 
details this Note’s conclusion: that if a use restriction is necessary for innovation (not 
simply tied to the market economy), then the use restriction must be enforced. 
Section III.B demonstrates that the Court has already found instances where 
exceptions are warranted, namely, in cases involving restrictions on licensees. 
 
224. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638. 
225. Id. at 625–26. 
226. Id. at 626 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
511 (1917)). 
227. Id. at 636 (rebutting LGE’s argument that the sale was not authorized and that Quanta 
therefore could not purchase what Intel was not authorized to sell). 
228. Id. at 638. 
229. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585–
86 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“After reviewing Quanta, Mallinckrodt, and the parties arguments, this Court is 
persuaded that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio.”). 
230. See supra note 156. 
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Section III.C critiques the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt decision, but concludes that 
the court’s holding—although not its reasoning—survives this ad hoc analysis. 
A. The Single-Royalty Theory Must Yield Under Proper Circumstances 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court has made clear that a patent owner 
generally receives her entire reward through the purchase price of the sold article. 
To allow the patent owner to place restrictions on the article’s use would enhance 
her reward beyond the intentions of Congress. This the Court cannot allow. 
But, on the other hand, the Court has also made clear that the patent owner 
must receive a full reward.231 This reward must be sufficient to encourage future 
patent owners to put time and effort into developing future inventions.232 It must 
encourage innovation. 
A court, therefore, must always consider whether condemning a use restriction 
would stifle innovation. In most cases, it does not, so the single-royalty theory 
applies. But it does do so in limited circumstances, as detailed below. In such 
circumstances, the Court must uphold such restrictions. 
1. Determining the Proper Reward Requires an Ad Hoc Analysis 
Scholars agree that the U.S. patent system is designed to promote innovation 
through granting exclusive rights as a reward.233 The traditional view is that this 
reward should “give as little protection as possible consistent with encouraging 
innovation.”234 But how much reward should be given before this minimum 
incentive is reached? 
There is no bright line answer to this question. As Professors Dan Burk and 
Mark Lemley note: “Different industries vary greatly in how they approach 
innovation, the cost of innovation, and the importance of innovation to continued 
growth. For innovation, one size definitely does not fit all.”235 Courts must thus 
determine the size of the reward case-by-case, looking at factors such as the type of 
creation and the nature of the industry.236 
Further, scholars note that any reward involves an equivalent burden on 
society. The patent owner’s exclusive rights inhibit competition, so a large reward 
yields a large public burden, albeit temporarily.237 As a result, courts also need to 
 
231. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1941) (stating the test as whether the 
patent owner has received her reward). 
232. Id. at 278 (noting that the patent owner’s reward is the means by which innovation is 
fostered). 
233. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37 (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the 
purpose of the patent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage 
invention.”). 
234. Lemley, supra note 60, at 1031. No more protection is appropriate, considering that the 
patent owner’s exclusive rights come at the expense of the public. See id. 
235. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 38. 
236. See Lemley, supra note 60, at 1066. 
237. See id. at 1031. 
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determine, case-by-case, where the proper balance lies between the inventor’s 
benefit and societal harm.238 
Therefore, determining the reward needed to foster innovation requires an ad 
hoc analysis. The Court will look at the nature of the invention, the nature of the 
industry, and the harm to the public. In doing so, the Court will strive to grant the 
minimal level of reward that will successfully foster innovation. 
2. The Purchase Price Encourages Innovation in Most Cases 
The prospect of selling an invention for monetary compensation will foster 
innovation in nearly all circumstances. In fact, the Court in Adams v. Burke found 
this to be true “in the essential nature of things”—that is, in ordinary 
circumstances.239 This language establishes a strong presumption against enforcing 
use restrictions, because the purchase price is a sufficient reward. 
“[T]he essential nature of things” occurs where the purchase price can 
represent the article’s value. The nature of the article does not require the patent 
owner to implement restrictions in order to sell the article. Rather, whether or not 
the invention sells depends on the market.240 In this light, the single-royalty theory 
does not stifle innovation. Patent owners will strive to create patentable, marketable 
inventions. They know that if they create a useful, popular invention, then they will 
reap a great reward. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has revolved around this “essential nature 
of things” category. In this respect, the Court has seen patent owners try to 
implement use restrictions to better position themselves in the market. These patent 
owners seek to gain a competitive edge that they would not have had without those 
restrictions. Such restrictions are unenforceable. 
But not all scenarios fall within the “essential nature of things.” Sometimes, 
the nature of the invention may warrant use restrictions. At bottom, in all cases, the 
test is not simply whether the patent owner has received the purchase price. Rather, 
“[t]he test [is] whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it 
may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for the use of the 
article.”241 As seen above, receiving the purchase price generally satisfies this test. 
However, exceptions exist. 
3. The Nature of the Invention May Warrant Use Restrictions 
Use restrictions should be enforced where the nature of the invention justifies 
the restriction. As discussed above, the exclusive right granted by Congress must 
provide the minimal level of protection required to foster innovation. The Court 
 
238. See id. at 1032. 
239. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873). 
240. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917) (“If [the 
patent owner’s] discovery is an important one his reward . . . will be large . . . .”). 
241. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942). 
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will seek—ad hoc—to strike an appropriate balance by considering not only the 
benefit to the inventor, but also the resulting harm to society. 
In striking this balance, the Court will consider the totality of the 
circumstances, including the nature of the invention and the nature of the 
industry.242 In most cases, the purchase price is a sufficient reward. Therefore, in 
general, the Court should assume that any use restrictions are an attempt to enhance 
the patent owner’s position in the market. The burden should then fall on the patent 
owner to explain why this is not the case. 
To prevail, the patent owner must successfully explain that her use restrictions 
are warranted due to the nature of the invention rather than the market. To do so, 
the patent owner will need to demonstrate that simply raising the purchase price 
will not remove the need for the use restrictions. In other words, the patent owner 
must show that the use restrictions are inextricably intertwined with the nature of 
the invention or industry. In other words, the purchase price is not able to equal the 
reward. The nature must be such that removing the use restrictions would stifle 
innovation. 
In such scenarios, the use restrictions must be upheld. The case-by-case nature 
of this question makes it difficult to predict exactly what scenarios warrant this 
result. However, existing case law has depicted two such scenarios: (1) where the 
use restrictions are necessary to prevent the invention from harming the public, and 
(2) where the use restrictions are necessary to prevent the patent from losing all 
value entirely.243 
a. Use Restrictions that Protect the Public 
Protecting the public surely warrants the enforcement of use restrictions. To 
take an extreme example, suppose an invention has two potential uses: Use A and 
Use B. Use A is the invention’s intended use—a valuable, marketable use that can 
be enjoyed by the public. Use B, on the other hand, causes widespread 
environmental or biological damage that greatly harms the public. The patent owner 
requires purchasers to sign a contract that they will use the invention only for Use 
A—and not for Use B—and requires them to provide an identical contract to any 
subsequent purchaser. A purchaser violates the contract, and the owner sues for 
patent infringement. 
The case is appealed to the Supreme Court. The defendant argues that per the 
Court’s holding in Motion Picture Patents and Quanta, the plaintiff cannot seek to 
enhance her reward, as the Patent Act is not intended to secure private fortunes. 
The plaintiff counters that she is not extending her reward, but is simply protecting 
the public through the use restriction. She argues that the nature of her invention 
 
242. See supra Section III.A.1. 
243. Further, as discussed in Section III.B., infra, the Court has established an exception for use 
restrictions on licensees, rather than purchasers. 
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could potentially harm the public. She needs to protect the public; she cannot 
warrant removing the use restriction simply by raising the purchase price. 
After hearing both sides, the Court considers how it will ensure that the patent 
owner receives a reward just large enough to foster innovation, but no larger. It 
considers what is the appropriate balance between the exclusive right granted and 
the resulting harm to the public. The Court realizes that, unlike most cases, the use 
restriction here actually benefits the public. Further, the Court concludes that, if the 
patent owner cannot prohibit Use B, then future patent owners in the industry may 
not be incentivized to create similar inventions. 
The Court in this case should rule for the plaintiff. The use restriction is 
enforceable because it is a result of the nature of the invention, rather than the 
market. The restriction is necessary to protect the public and foster innovation. 
b. Use Restrictions that Prevent Destruction of the Patent 
The right to exclude is a core tenet of patent law.244 Intellectual property—an 
intangible good—is “non-rivalrous”: consumption by one individual does not 
prevent simultaneous consumption by another individual.245 Without patent law, 
anyone could freely use such nonrivalrous property.246 The right to exclude thus 
provides inventors with an incentive to invent.247 The public will not be able to use 
inventions for free, but will need to pay for that right.248 
In general, the first-sale doctrine does not hinder this incentive. A patent 
owner cannot control the disposition of a sold article, but she certainly can control 
the disposition of articles that have not been sold. She plans to sell many articles. 
With this in mind, future patent owners have a strong incentive to invent. 
But suppose the patent owner, absent a use restriction, would be unable to sell 
multiple articles. Suppose that the nature of her invention is such that, after a single 
sale, consumers will never need to purchase additional articles. In such a case, the 
first-sale doctrine would completely swallow the right to exclude. The patent would 
be worthless, and innovation would be stifled. 
At oral argument in Quanta, Justice Kennedy nicely summed up this scenario 
with the following question to LGE’s attorney: “Are there cases where some 
downstream restrictions on use might be necessary to prevent the patent from 
becoming worthless, i.e., in the biological area for replication of seeds in agriculture 
 
244. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37. 
245. Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 365, 369 (2007) (“[T]he inventions and expressions that intellectual property law protects 
are non-rivalrous in consumption . . . .”); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 7 (“[I]nvention is a 
‘public good’ because it is expensive to invent but cheap to copy those inventions.”). 
246. Anyone could use intellectual property because it is intangible. For example, if an inventor 
discovers a novel method of making a chair, once the public learns of the method, then anyone could 
use it themselves. Patent law makes this property exclusive. 
247. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37. 
248. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (noting that the damages for patent infringement may in no 
circumstances be “less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer”). 
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and so forth?”249 Although LGE’s attorney did not directly answer—and the facts 
of Quanta did not implicate—the question, Justice Kennedy’s question directly 
details a scenario where use restrictions would indeed be enforceable. 
The Court came close to answering this question in Bowman v. Monsanto—the 
third scenario depicted in this Note’s introduction. In Bowman, respondent 
Monsanto sold genetically modified soybeans to farmers, which yielded herbicide-
resistant crops.250 These crops themselves yielded more soybeans, but Monsanto 
prohibited the planting of any second-generation beans.251 The rational was that if 
farmers could grow their own soybeans, then after a single sale, farmers would never 
need to purchase beans from Monsanto.252 
Petitioner Bowman replanted second-generation seeds, and Monsanto sued 
for patent infringement.253 The Court, however, did not answer whether the use 
restriction was enforceable. It held that—by utilizing second-generation seeds—
Bowman had improperly made, rather than used, the patented invention.254 The 
exclusive right to “make” can never be exhausted.255 As a result, the Court did not 
need to address Justice Kennedy’s question in Quanta. 
After Bowman, one potential response to Justice Kennedy’s question could be 
a flat “no.” That argument would note that Bowman determined that seed replication 
is impermissible reconstruction, not use. The argument would conclude that Justice 
Kennedy’s question is moot because it simply describes a scenario that, in reality, 
can never occur. 
But this argument fails because it only considers present-day technology. It 
would not be difficult to imagine that, in the future, a similar scenario could arise 
where it is clear that the purchaser has used, rather than made, the invention. 
Perhaps, for example, the DNA of the initial seed could be extracted and then 
injected into other seeds, which would themselves gain the desired herbicide-
resistant qualities. And the Court has made clear that “[a] rule that unanticipated 
inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent 
law that anticipation undermines patentability.”256 
Just because such a case has not arisen yet does not detract from the fact that, 
when such a case arises in the future, patent owners will need use restrictions to 
prevent their patents from becoming worthless. Without such restrictions, 
innovation would be stifled. As Justice Roberts stated at oral argument in Bowman: 
 
249. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 
617 (2008) (No. 06-937). 
250. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013). 
251. Id. Monsanto notified purchasers of this restriction via a “bag tag” notice that was 
provided with the soybeans. See Rogers, supra note 10, at 421. 
252. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (explaining 
Monsanto’s argument), aff’d, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
253. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765. 
254. Id. at 1766. 
255. Id. 
256. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001). 
Roth__production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2016  7:17 PM 
1264 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:1231 
“Why in the world would anybody spend any money to try to improve the seed if 
as soon as they sold the first one anybody could grow more and have as many of 
those seeds as they want?”257 
c. The Court Will Scrutinize the Patent Owner’s Intentions 
As the above scenarios demonstrate, use restrictions are enforceable in limited 
circumstances. However, even if a patent owner demonstrates that her invention 
warrants such restrictions, she must also convince the Court that the restrictions are 
not simply a pretext designed to increase market power. What should the Court do, 
for example, if a use restriction protects the public health, but also leads to monetary 
gain? 
As before, the Court will need to engage in an ad hoc analysis to determine the 
patent owner’s intentions. The Court has made clear it will look to the “substances 
and realities of the transaction” to determine whether a restriction was intended to 
“secur[e] . . . that exclusive right . . . which is granted through the patent law, or 
whether, under color of such a purpose, it is . . . an effort to profitably extend the 
scope of its patent.”258 If the restriction appears truly necessary to secure 
innovation, the Court will allow it; if not, then the restriction is unenforceable.259 
B. An Exception—Restrictions on Licensees 
1. The “Reward” Drives Both Lines of Cases 
The Supreme Court has made a distinction between licensees and 
purchasers.260 The Court typically permits a patent owner to restrict a licensee, but 
not a purchaser.261 Some scholars believe that this distinction exists because 
different lines of case law govern each restriction. While the single-royalty theory 
governs restrictions on purchasers,262 a different law controls restrictions on 
licensees. The scholars note that only an authorized sale can implicate the first-sale 
doctrine.263 So, therefore, if a licensee did not adhere to a restriction, then no first 
sale had occurred. 
One problem with the above reasoning is that it makes the first-sale doctrine 
too easy to circumvent. Some fear that patent owners will simply begin calling their 
purchasers “licensees.”264 However, the Court has addressed this concern, saying 
 
257. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 
11-796). 
258. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1916). 
259. Id. Also, in some cases, the Court may enforce restrictions only to the extent necessary. See 
infra note 322. 
260. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1926). 
261. Id. 
262. See supra Section II. 
263. Server & Casey, supra note 15, at 582 (noting that restrictions on licensees do not trigger 
exhaustion because the resulting sales are unauthorized). 
264. Id. (noting that the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt relied on this argument in its holding). 
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that it knows to look carefully at any agreement to determine whether it is a purchase 
or really a license.265 Therefore, instead, some commentators more correctly fear 
that patent owners will use licensees as unnecessary “middlemen,” with the 
intention to restrict purchasers.266 It seems odd that the Court would have two lines 
of cases that are readily confused. 
The answer must be that there are not really two lines of cases. True, the first 
sale must be authorized. But, as discussed below, some restrictions on licensees are 
unenforceable, even if the licensee adheres to them. This is because a single 
concept—the patent owner’s reward—governs restrictions on both licensees and 
purchasers. The Court multiple times has expressly said that it only tolerates 
restrictions on licensees where the restriction is within the patent owner’s reward.267 
The Court has explained that, in the usual case, a licensee with unrestricted access 
might hinder the patent owner from making her own sales.268 And the first-sale 
doctrine has always protected the patent owner with respect to articles not yet sold. 
Therefore, in general, restrictions on licensees are necessary for the patent owner to 
receive her reward. 
The Court’s reliance on the patent owner’s reward is important. It explains 
why licensees are treated differently than purchasers. It reveals that, in both 
instances, the “reward” drives the Court’s analysis. With this understanding, patent 
owners will be unlikely to improperly circumvent the first-sale doctrine. A patent 
owner will not be able to use a licensee as a “middleman” to bind purchasers 
because the Court, as always, will analyze whether the restriction is within the patent 
owner’s reward. 
2. Restrictions on Licensees Must Be Justified 
The case law involving restrictions on licensees makes clear that the 
restrictions must be within the scope of the patent owner’s reward. Not all types of 
restrictions get through. The Court typically will only enforce restrictions on licenses 
where the licensee manufactures the articles, or whether the type of license is 
common in the industry. 
In United States v. General Electric Co., the Court set forth the law governing 
restrictions on licensees.269 General Electric Company (GE) owned three patents 
involving the making of electric lamps.270 The U.S. Government sued under 
antitrust law, claiming in part that GE was unlawfully restraining trade through GE’s 
license agreements. GE would enter into agreements with licensees, and the license 
terms provided that GE would be allowed to control the price at which the patented 
articles were sold. 
 
265. See infra notes 288–90 and accompanying text. 
266. See Austin, supra note 7, at 2972–73. 
267. See infra Section III.B.2. 
268. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 480–81. 
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The Court acknowledged that, against purchasers, use restrictions are typically 
unenforceable: “It is well settled . . . that where a patentee makes the patented article 
and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to 
do with the article after his purchase.”271 But the Court stated that “the question is 
a different one” when considering “what a patentee who grants a license . . . to make 
and vend . . . may do in limiting the licensee.”272 
The Court then ruled that use restrictions on licensees are enforceable 
“provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to secure 
pecuniary reward for the patentee’s monopoly.”273 The Court explained that the 
price at which a licensee sells a patent article affects the patent owner’s ability to sell 
other patented articles.274 GE had thus acted “entirely reasonabl[y]” to control the 
licensee’s sale price.275 
A similar result occurred in General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric Co.276 The 
American Telephone & Telegraph Company owned patents on vacuum tube 
amplifiers.277 The technology was useful in both commercial theaters as well as in 
private radio.278 The American Transformer Company had a nonexclusive license 
to sell the amplifiers for private use only.279 But it sold the amplifiers to a 
purchaser—the petitioner—with both parties knowing the purchaser would use it 
in the commercial field.280 
The Court found the purchaser liable, as the restriction on the licensee was 
enforceable, and the purchaser had notice.281 The Court concluded that the 
restriction on the licensee was within the patent owner’s reward.282 The Court 
subsequently affirmed that reasoning by stating: 
The patentee may grant a license upon any condition the performance of 
which is reasonably within the [patent owner’s] reward . . . . The restriction 
here imposed is of that character. . . . [I]t is common practice where a 
patented invention is applicable to different uses . . . [to] restrict[ ] to one 
or more of the several fields of use . . . .283 
The Court upheld the restriction as a result.284 
 
271. Id. at 489. Later in the opinion, the Court strongly endorsed the general application of the 
single-royalty theory by noting that “a patentee may not attach . . . a condition running with the article 
in the hands of purchasers.” Id. at 494. 
272. Id. at 489. 
273. Id. at 490. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938). 
277. Id. at 176, 179. 
278. Id. at 179. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 180. 
281. Id. at 180, 183. 
282. Id. at 181. 
283. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938). 
284. Id. 
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In some instances, however, the Court has found that restrictions on licensees 
are unenforceable. For example, in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., the Court 
found that an alleged license was actually a sale to a purchaser.285 Among other 
things, the patent owner required immediate payment of full consideration and did 
not keep itself closely informed of the product’s disposition.286 The Court found 
that the patent owner was simply trying to mask an impermissible use restriction 
under the licensee exception.287 
Also, the Court has refused to enforce restrictions on licensees that are too 
broad. In Standard Sanitary v. United States, the Court found that the purpose of the 
licensee restriction—control of the enamel iron industry—”clearly . . . transcended 
what was necessary to protect the use of the patent.”288 Similarly, in United States v. 
Masonite Corp., the Court found that the restrictions on licensees impermissibly 
attempted to restrain competition in the hardboard industry.289 The Masonite Court 
explained that “[i]n the General Electric case, the Court thought that the purpose . . . 
was to secure to the patentee . . . a reward for his invention. We cannot agree that 
that is true here.”290 
It therefore appears clear that the cases involving restrictions on licensees stem 
from the same reasoning as restrictions on purchasers. In both cases, the Court will 
ensure that the patent owner is not inflating her reward. But restrictions are always 
permitted when necessary to secure that reward. 
C. The Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence 
Despite the Supreme Court’s strong presumption in favor of the single-royalty 
theory, the Federal Circuit has developed its own jurisprudence that favors the 
conditional-sale theory. Beginning with the court’s decision in Mallinckrodt v. 
Medipart,291 the Federal Circuit has made clear that use restrictions are generally 
enforceable. The Federal Circuit’s 2010 decision in Princo v. International Trade 
Commission makes clear that the court has adhered to its own jurisprudence even 
after the Supreme Court’s 2008 Quanta decision.292 
The Federal Circuit’s failure to align itself with Supreme Court decisions is 
troubling. The Federal Circuit was created in part to provide predictable, uniform 
 
285. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 498, 500 (1916) (finding that the 
alleged license was “a disguised attempt to control the prices of its machines after they have been sold 
and paid for”). 
286. Id. at 498–99. By contrast, in General Electric, the licensee paid no money until the item was 
sold. General Electric, 272 U.S. at 484. 
287. See Straus, 243 U.S. at 500. 
288. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 48 (1912). 
289. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280–81 (1942). 
290. Id. at 280. 
291. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
292. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (continuing to 
apply Mallinckrodt in spite of Quanta). As noted above, as this Note goes to press, the en banc Federal 
Circuit is considering overruling Mallinckrodt in light of Quanta. Supra note 17. 
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results in the area of patent law.293 Some scholars argue that the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence has done anything but that; rather, the Circuit has caused confusion 
and uncertainty.294 In recent years, the Supreme Court has begun hearing more 
patent cases than ever before, almost always reversing the Federal Circuit.295 
The Mallinckrodt decision is a good example of the confusion the Federal 
Circuit has caused. Below, this Note first discusses why the court’s reasoning is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, even prior to Quanta. Then, 
this Note explains that, although Mallinckrodt’s reasoning is misguided, the facts of 
Mallinckrodt support the ultimate holding under Supreme Court jurisprudence. This 
is why Quanta did not overrule Mallinckrodt and made no mention of Mitchell v. 
Hawley. 
1. Mallinckrodt’s Reasoning Is Not Supported by Law 
Mallinckrodt involved a patented medical device that used radioactive mist to 
diagnose whether a patient had lung disease.296 A nebulizer would generate the 
radioactive material, the patient would inhale the material via a mouthpiece, and 
whatever the patient exhaled would be trapped and analyzed by the device.297 
Plaintiff Mallinckrodt made and sold these devices to hospitals with a “single use” 
notification affixed to the packaging.298 The hospitals were instructed to dispose of 
the device in a radiation-shielded container after the first use.299 
But the hospitals ignored Mallinckrodt’s notice; they instead shipped the 
devices to defendant Medipart to be refurbished.300 Medipart would attempt to 
sterilize the devices and would then send them back to the hospitals.301 Mallinckrodt 
sued Medipart for patent infringement.302 Medipart argued that, under the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Bauer and Motion Picture Patents, the conditional-sale theory had 
met its demise.303 Mallinckrodt countered that conditional sales are permissible and 
 
293. Wegner, supra note 17, at 686 (“When the Federal Circuit was established in 1982, it was 
done so seemingly with a mandate for the new court to create a uniform body of patent law for the 
United States.”). 
294. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 21, at 201 (highlighting the discontent that some scholars have 
with the Federal Circuit). 
295. Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Patent Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204, 204 (2008–2009) (calling the last decade a 
“flurry of reversals”). 
296. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701. 
297. Id. at 702. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. Specifically, Medipart exposed the devices to “at least 2.5 megarads of gamma 
radiation”; however, Medipart did not test the devices afterward for biological activity or radioactivity. 
Id. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 703. 
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that further, the nature of the invention implicated the health and safety of the 
public.304 
The Federal Circuit ruled for Mallinckrodt under the conditional-sale 
theory.305 The court held that Bauer and Motion were simply instances of patent 
misuse, and that “not all restrictions on the use of patented goods are 
unenforceable.”306 Citing General Electric, the court noted that restrictions on 
licensees are permitted where the restriction reasonably secures the patent owner’s 
reward.307 The court acknowledged that General Electric involved a restriction on a 
licensee—and not a purchaser—but said that “neither law, public policy, nor logic” 
warranted making this distinction.308 The court noted that a licensee versus 
purchaser distinction would be easy to circumvent with better contract drafting and 
that the law cannot turn on “formalistic line drawing.”309 
The Court held: “Unless the [use] condition violates some other law or 
policy . . . private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of 
sale.”310 In the patent context, so long as the restriction is “reasonably within the 
patent grant,” it properly secures the patent owner’s reward under General Electric.311 
With this holding, the Federal Circuit revived the conditional-sale theory from the 
grave. 
The flaw in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is twofold. First, the Federal Circuit 
distinguishes Bauer and Motion Picture Patents on the ground that those cases involved 
patent misuse.312 But as detailed in Section II.A, those cases clearly turn on the 
Court’s determination that post-sale control by the patent owner goes beyond 
Congress’s intentions.313 Mallinckrodt looks at the Court’s holding but ignores the 
Court’s reasoning. 
Second, the Federal Circuit is incorrect that there is no basis in law for making 
a distinction between restrictions on licensees and restrictions on purchasers. As 
noted in Section III.B, General Electric clearly held that “the question is a different 
one” when dealing with restrictions on licensees.314 Further, the Court’s ad hoc 
analysis prevents the cases from turning on “formalistic line drawing.”315 The Court 
will look to the “substances and realities” of the transaction to discern whether the 
 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 709. 
306. Id. at 703. 
307. Id. at 704–05 (quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)). 
308. Id. at 705. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 708. 
311. See id. The Federal Circuit in B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 
(Fed. Cir. 1997), elaborates that whether a restriction is within the patent grant turns on “whether, by 
imposing the condition, the patentee has ‘impermissibly broadened the “physical or temporal scope” 
of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.’” 
312. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704. 
313. See supra Section II.A. 
314. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926); see also supra Section III.B. 
315. Such line drawing was the court’s fear in Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. 
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patent owner has attempted to disguise a purchaser restriction as a licensee 
restriction.316 Overall, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
2. Mallinckrodt’s Holding Was Correct—It Protected Public Safety 
As discussed above, Mallinckrodt’s reasoning is inconsistent with the first-sale 
doctrine and the Supreme Court’s holding in Quanta. Further, the Supreme Court 
in Quanta reversed the Federal Circuit, which had relied on Mallinckrodt’s 
reasoning.317 The big question, then, is why did Quanta not overrule Mallinckrodt? 
The answer is likely that Quanta did not want to completely shut the door on 
the conditional-sale theory. As noted in Section III.A.3 above, certain scenarios 
require the application of the conditional-sale theory.318 One such scenario is when 
the use restriction is necessary to protect the health of the public. 
Had Quanta flatly overruled Mallinckrodt, Quanta would have overturned a 
holding that was very likely correct. Mallinckrodt involved a medical device that 
generated a radioactive mist inhaled by patients for the diagnosis of lung disease.319 
The patients would then exhale directly into the device.320 Although Medipart 
attempted to sterilize the devices, it did not test for residual biological activity or 
radioactivity.321 Mallinckrodt expressly argued that the “single use” restriction was 
required to protect the public health. 
Should Mallinckrodt have been required to simply hope that patients would 
not get sick after reusing the refurbished medical devices? From this perspective, 
the single use restriction appears necessary to secure innovation. Mallinckrodt will 
not likely be incentivized to make nebulizers if patients will get sick and sue 
Mallinckrodt. This use restriction does not harm the public; it benefits the public. 
Of course, the Court will need to look at all the circumstances to ensure that 
Mallinckrodt does not have improper intentions.322 But the facts in this case (i.e., 
 
316. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1916). 
317. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom. 
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
318. See supra Section III.A.3. 
319. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1916). Further, the Court 
may enforce the use restrictions to the extent that they protect the public health. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. 
v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 445–46 (1939), the government sought to enjoin Ethyl Gasoline from 
enforcing license provisions involving the sale of patented gasoline additives to oil refiners. The license 
contained multiple clauses, one of which required the oil refiners—as well as any subsequent 
purchasers—to conform to the health regulations set by the Surgeon General. Id. at 447. The Court 
engaged in an ad hoc analysis, holding that the license as a whole sought to “control conduct by the 
licensee not embraced in the patent monopoly.” Id. at 456. However, the Court expressly stated that 
the health provisions “are not interfered with by the decree.” Id. at 459–60. The Court thus 
demonstrated its willingness to enforce certain restrictions, but not others, based on whether the 
restriction was meant to protect the public health. 
 Notably, at oral argument in Lexmark, Judge Newman appeared to support this Note’s contention 
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the nature of the patented invention) appear to warrant the use restriction. Quanta 
did not want to upset precedent that protects the public health. 
CONCLUSION 
The first-sale doctrine strives to strike the appropriate balance between the 
rights of patent owners and the rights of personal property owners. The first 
authorized sale exhausts the patent owner’s ability to control the further disposition 
of the sold article. As a result, personal property owners have complete control over 
purchased articles. Allowing such control promotes competition and ensures that 
the sold articles may be used in the most efficient way possible. At the same time, 
the patent owner retains the right to exclude others from using patented articles not 
yet sold. 
The Court has not provided a bright-line rule as to whether express use 
restrictions on patented articles are enforceable. In most cases, however, the single-
royalty theory appears to control, prohibiting patent owners from implementing 
such restrictions on purchasers. The rationale is that use restrictions hinder the 
purchaser’s rights and improperly inflate the patent owner’s reward. However, in 
certain scenarios where the nature of the invention warrants the use restrictions, it 
appears likely that such restrictions are enforceable. For example, if the use 
restrictions are necessary to protect the public heath, or to prevent the destruction 
of the patent, then the Court will uphold those restrictions. In such cases, the 
restrictions do not improperly inflate the patent owner’s reward. Rather, the 
restrictions are necessary to foster innovation—a central requirement of the patent 
statute. Overall, the Court will engage in an ad hoc analysis to ensure that innovation 
is fostered without unduly harming the public or inflating the patent owner’s reward. 
The first-sale doctrine cannot stifle innovation. 
 
that an ad hoc approach is necessary to protect the public health. Recording of Oral Argument at 19:16–
20:03, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., No. 14-1617 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2015) (“What’s so 
troublesome about these cases—you get wrapped up in generalizations . . . . [In] Mallinckrodt, the 
restriction on reuse was for a product, a nebulizer, which, in use, gets filled with pneumococcus and 
other deadly bacteria and viruses . . . . So, the producer says: ‘You can’t reuse this. You’ll kill everybody.’ 
And yet, here we are, saying that’s not allowed . . . . Don’t we have to allow our evolution of the law to 
recognize the complexities of practice . . . ?”). 
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